Missouri Law Review
Volume 70
Issue 4 Fall 2005

Article 3

Fall 2005

Monastic Life of a Federal Distric Judge, The
Colleen McMahon

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Colleen McMahon, Monastic Life of a Federal Distric Judge, The, 70 MO. L. REV. (2005)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol70/iss4/3

This Conference is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of
University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
bassettcw@missouri.edu.

McMahon: McMahon: Monastic Life of a Federal Distric Judge

The Monastic Life of a Federal District
Judge
Colleen McMahon
THE LIFE OF A DISTRICT JUDGE

This symposium has focused on the work of appellate judges, and in
particular one appellate judge, Harry Blackmun, who sat on the nation's
highest court. One of the theses posited by the symposium presenters is that
judges who sit on collegial courts - courts where judges sit on panels and
reach decisions as a group of three, or seven, or nine - are influenced by the
process of having to forge consensus with their brethren (and sistren, as I call
2
the women who have joined those courts).
I am a trial judge, and that means I sit on a "non-collegial" court. I do
not mean that I sit on an unfriendly court - some of my dearest friends are
judges of the Southern District of New York - but rather, that I sit on a court
in which cases are decided individually, rather than collegially.
This lack of "collegial" decision-making is without question the best
part of being a district judge. District judges make their own decisions, informed by their own view of the facts and their own reading of the law. We
"nisi prius" judges, to use the old Latin term, are of course constrained by the
holdings of appellate courts. But to do our job, we do not have to reach a
consensus with anyone about what those decisions mean - except perhaps
with our law clerks, who are wonderful, but young and, I have to admit, more
than a little bit in awe of their bosses. Trial-level judges are absolutely and
completely unconstrained by outside opinions. And in the federal system,
trial-level judges, like all Article III judges, have life tenure, which means we
do not have to worry about losing our position if a decision offends some
powerful person. Finally, district judges rarely create a paper trail of memos
and drafts and thereby escape the sort of scholarly scrutiny that haunts those
on higher courts.
Life is very different on an appellate court, a collegial court. I have had
the honor and the pleasure of sitting by designation on the Second Circuit on
two occasions. As much as I enjoyed the experience (and I did enjoy it), I was
happy to get back to my own court, where I could make up my mind without
having to exchange drafts and converse via memorandum with two other
judges - and where I did not have to lobby for someone's vote so my point of
view could prevail.
But the very absence of collegiality in the decision-making process - the
lack of any debate, any need to reach consensus or satisfy the concerns of
1. District Judge, United States District Court, Southern District of New York.
2. See Suzanna Sherry, Politics and Judgment, 70 Mo. L. REv. 973 (2005).
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others and any mandatory interaction with one's colleagues - means that life
on a district court lacks some elements of the other kind of collegiality as
well. It is for that reason that I refer to my life as "monastic."
Monks live solitary lives in community. So do district judges. All the
judges in a single district constitute "a court," but that is something of a misnomer. Unlike our colleagues on courts of appeals, district court judges operate entirely independently. Even on the friendliest of courts, and even in districts like mine, where almost all the judges come to the same place every
day, every judge spends most of his time in a private enclave - the judge's
chambers. Within that private enclave there is only an adoring personal staff
of four for company. It is a very quiet life. People do not drop in except by
appointment, and then only to talk about their cases - not about the weather,
sports, or family, and especially not about the great issues of the day. Personal relationships, at least with lawyers, are discouraged, lest they get in the
way of objective decision-making. Political discourse with almost anyone is
strictly forbidden. District judges reflect on the intellectual issues that confront us in solitude and pronounce on them formally; then we step back and
let the public record do the talking. And of course, trial judges, like all lifetenured judges, are a people "set apart." We are too often lionized rather than
humanized - a phenomenon best illustrated by the fact that no one ever calls
any judge by his given name.
In fact, there is no one on earth more monk-like than a federal district
judge. As a result, there is no one on earth who more surely needs to have
some understanding of core monastic virtues in order to do the job well.
THE VIRTUE OF SELF-AWARENESS

In her Wake Forest Law Review piece, and again during her presentation for this symposium, Professor Susanna Sherry argued that judges of
character should aspire to two virtues: humility and courage. 3 While I cannot
quarrel with that proposition, I would suggest that it is even more important
for judges to exhibit the virtue of self-awareness. And it is more important for
a district court judge to exhibit this virtue than it is for a Justice of the United
States Supreme Court.
By self-awareness, I mean two things. The first is knowledge about who
one is as a person, what one values and does not value and what motivates
one's decisional processes. The second is the ability to be completely honest
with oneself about such matters. When the term "self-awareness" is defined
in that way, it becomes clear why no single character trait could be of greater
3. Suzanna Sherry, Judicial Review: Blessing or Curse? Or Both? A Symposium in Commemoration of the Bicentennial of Marbury v. Madison, 38 WAKE
FoREST L. REv. 793, 797-98 (2003); Suzanna Sherry, Politics and Judgment, 70 Mo.
L. REv. 973, 982 (2005).
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importance to any jurist. It is out of self-awareness that virtues like those
mentioned by Professor Sherry spring. It is simply impossible to be humble,
or courageous, or display any of the other traits that must be shown by judges
if one is self-deluded. That is one reason why Justice Blackmun's papers are
so riveting: He possessed an understanding of who he was and what motivated him to act that ought not be, but I suspect is, rare in a powerful public
man.

Interior contemplation directed toward the acquisition of that sort of
self-awareness and a corresponding inability to delude oneself about ones
own actions is integral to monastic life. So, the virtue I nominate as cardinal
to a judge is a monastic virtue.
Now why do I think that self-awareness is of greater importance to a
mere peon like myself, who sits on a trial level, than it is to a lordly Justice of
the highest court in the land? A district court judge touches and determines
the course of so very many lives. In just two or three years on the bench, a
single trial level judge will serve as the final decision-maker in far, far more
cases than any United States Supreme Court Justice will ever see, no matter
how long she sits on the Court. A district court judge disposes of, in some
way or other, every one of the hundreds of cases that are filed in his court
each year. For the vast majority of cases, that disposition represents the end
of the process. Not every case that is filed - not even every case that is disposed of by a decision or verdict, rather than by a settlement or plea - is appealed to an intermediate appellate court, let alone to the Supreme Court. And
even when a case is appealed, not every issue that aggrieves the appellant
receives the same level of scrutiny that a district court judge must, perforce,
give to the issues on his docket. In fact, most of what a district judge decides
is never reexamined on appeal, and what is reexamined will be looked at under an extraordinarily deferential standard. Many of a district judge's decision
are reviewed for abuse of discretion or for clear error - standards that virtually presume the trial judge acted correctly. Appellate judges rarely interfere
with evidentiary decisions, docket control matters, or jury instructions, except
in the most extraordinary circumstances. Even review of a decision de novo is
contoured by the district judge's opinion, in which the issues have been
shaped and framed for future discussion.
So, there is a compelling argument to be made that district court judges
are the most powerful judges in the land. And when power can be experienced without personal consequence - as when it is exercised in order to adjudicate the rights and responsibilities of others - it would be dangerous if
there were no brake on its use.
The reason that district court judges have a particularly acute need for
self-awareness is because they are the only check on their own behavior or
misbehavior. It is precisely because district judges do not need to persuade
anyone to vote with them in order to reach a decision and do not have to concern themselves with institutional issues across various courts that they need
to keep a finger on their own pulse at all times.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2005
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Who is going to keep a trial level judge intellectually honest, or make
that judge question her own motives, if not the judge herself?. Some bright
young person a month or a year out of law school? I hardly think so. I only
hire clerks who have a lot of moxie, but it is hard enough convincing them
that they should speak up if they think I am misinterpreting some case they
have called to my attention. It would be very difficult for most law clerks to
question a judge's thought processes or motives.
Can colleagues on the court serve as a check on each other? My colleagues are much too busy managing their own dockets to have a care for
mine. They will consult with me when asked to do so, but I have to initiate
the exchange and be careful about intruding on their time, which is in precious short supply. District judges pay little or no attention to the ongoing
work of their colleagues. Unless a pending case is in the headlines, we have
no way of knowing what other judges might be working on. So there is no
way that we could serve as a check on one another, even if we were so inclined - and in a court of independent equals, we are rarely, if ever, so inclined.
Can friends or former colleagues act to monitor judicial behavior? Court
matters are public matters, so one might think it all right to discuss them with
outsiders. Yet somehow it does not seem appropriate to involve outsiders in
the decision-making process, as the debate 4over the extra-judicial conversations of Felix Frankfurter should make clear.
No, we district judges have to save ourselves from our own worst instincts - the instinct to be proud, to be arrogant, to be hasty, to be careless, to
be unduly harsh, to be unduly lenient, and yes, to be absolutely certain that
we are right. We have to be honest with ourselves about the forces that will, if
we are not vigilant, impinge on our ability to make decisions for right reasons: ambition, a desire to be liked, a need to be respected, and above all, a
desire to impose some agenda on society. More than that, we have to be willing to bring ourselves up short when we catch ourselves factoring inappropriate considerations into our decision-making, be they preconceived notions,
prejudices, public opinion, or whatever happens to be flying around in the
political winds. Every judge is prone to be influenced by such forces, life
tenure notwithstanding. We lie to ourselves if we refuse to admit it. And today, when judges are under attack by politicians and the press for our real or
imagined "activism," the temptation is perhaps harder to resist than ever before.
I do not mean to suggest that judges should ignore their values when
making decisions. Just as society ought not want ignoramuses as sitting jurors, it ought not want judges who have no values. Trial judges, like jurors,
are to decide cases on the law and the facts. But as part of standard jury instructions, we tell jurors to evaluate the evidence in light of their experience
4. Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101
YALE L.J. 1193, 1194-95 (1992).
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and common sense. There is no reason to expect judges to act any differently
when they approach a case.
What judges must do is recognize when we are being influenced by
these various forces, and think explicitly about whether it is appropriate to be
so influenced. Trial level judges need to do this for themselves. In 99% of
cases, no one will ever know whether a judge was influenced by anything
other than what he publicly expressed, either in an opinion or at the time of
pronouncing sentence. But the judge will know. So it is important - especially for judges like me, who do not engage in dialogue with colleagues in
the process of deciding a case - to know ourselves down to the root of ourselves and to be completely honest with ourselves about why we are doing
what we are doing. Because there will inevitably be times when we must
conclude that the law compels us to do things that we would not do if we
made the rules rather than interpreted and enforced them.
Before I went on the bench, no one told me that it would be necessary to
engage in a continuous "examination of conscience," to borrow a term from
my religious tradition. I had to learn that for myself. And self-awareness is
not easily achieved - if only because, as any monk can tell you, one has to
make space in one's life for it to happen. I happen to have been invited by a
publisher to reflect on the intersection between what I do for a living and
what I believe as a Christian. I accepted that invitation, and eventually wrote
a little book of meditations from the perspective of a judge. Writing the book
was a useful exercise. It taught me something about myself, and about the
forces within and outside of me that might tend to play into my judicial decisions. Rereading the book, which I do from time to time, is even more useful;
it reminds me of things I need to think about, and guard against, as I do my
job.
If self-awareness is so important to judicial integrity, it ought to be high
on the list of things we look for in judicial candidates - equal to analyses of
their prior scholarship and their speeches and decisions and politics - or even,
as Professors Wrightsman and LaMort suggest, 5 on the correlates of success
on the Supreme Court: fathers' occupations, quality of legal education, even
their ethnic background. But all those other factors can be researched. It is
virtually impossible to know, at the moment of nomination, whether a candidate for a judgeship is interested in, or capable of, the kind of self-awareness
integral to being a good judge.
Fortunately, I believe that most people who become judges learn relatively quickly that they need to monitor themselves and their motives. A lot
of people suspect, as Thomas Jefferson suspected long ago, that most judges
are "activists" who want nothing more than to impose their personal social
agendas on society. And some judges - at both ends of the liberalconservative spectrum - are "activists" in that sense. However, I know quite a
5. Lawrence S. Wrightsman & Justin R. La Mort, Why Do Supreme Court Justices Succeed or Fail?Harry Blackmun as an Example, 70 Mo. L. REv. 1261 (2005).
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few judges, and almost without exception, they are not trying to impose their
personal preferences or vindicate some private agenda in their rulings. It may
be surprising to learn - it would certainly surprise some in political life or in
the press - that the judges I am talking about, the ones who manage to decide
cases without regard to politics or personal beliefs, are both Democrats and
Republicans. They are liberals, moderates and conservatives. They fall into
every race and creed and sexual orientation of which I am aware. Some are
wealthy and some are of modest means. Some have extensive experience in
private practice and some have spent a lifetime in the public sector. Some
have represented primarily plaintiffs; some have been prosecutors; and some
have represented primarily defendants. Some are deeply religious; some are
utterly secular. Some have an extensive history of political activity; others
have little or none.
But almost without exception, something happened to them when they
took their oath of office. There is something about the nature of a judge's job,
the weight of it, the responsibility it imposes - something symbolized by that
black robe, the vestment that hides our inglividuality behind our office - that
changes most of the people who take it on. Judges quickly realize that being a
judge is not about one's self, that it is bigger and more important than any
individual. So we shed our old advocate skins and grow into the job, by centering ourselves on an abstract ideal of justice, and we bring that ideal to bear
on whatever situation confronts us.
In short, we judges learn and practice the monastic discipline of selfknowledge. Would that society gave us the credit we deserve for doing so.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol70/iss4/3

6

